O Direito de voto dos condenados criminalmente: uma análise da aplicação do artigo 15, inciso III, da Constituição Federal

Abstract

This article elaborates a criticism on the way in which the suspension of the political rights resulting from a final criminal conviction, provided for in article 15, item III, of the Federal Constitution, is interpreted and applied by the legal system currently. This work does not refer to the passive electoral capacity of criminally convicted citizens, that is, the ability to be voted, but seeks to defend that its active electoral capacity, which includes the right to vote, should not be suspended. It seeks to demonstrate that the position of the rule of law by suspending the right to vote dehumanizes even more people who are criminally convicted After all, what can prevent them from exercising the right to vote? For the simple fact that they have a criminal conviction, do they automatically cease to have yearnings? Do you no longer have political opinions? Do they become subordinate to other people's opinions? Do not they have children, often still unable to exercise their citizenship, to represent at the polls? Finally, it is intended with this work to leave a criticism to the current understanding and present a possible broader, and consequently more citizen, view of article 15, item III, of the Federal Constitution.