Justiça organizacional e oportunismo em cooperativas agropecuárias da agricultura familiar: impactos no desempenho de relacionamento e nos custos de governança

Abstract

The objective of this research is to analyze strong and weak forms of opportunism as mediators of organizational justice perceptions and governance costs in agricultural cooperatives within the Itamarati settlement. Chapter 1 provides the conceptual background on strong and weak opportunism, the three dimensions of organizational justice (distributive, procedural, and interactional), relationship performance, and governance costs in agricultural cooperatives. Chapter 2 presents a state-of-the-art review, offering both a bibliographic and bibliometric analysis of recent scientific articles. Additionally, it proposes a conceptual framework that connects opportunism, organizational justice, and relationship performance. Chapter 3 details the empirical study conducted in the Itamarati settlement, which involved data collection through a multi-item scale questionnaire administered to producers from two cooperatives in the settlement. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was employed to assess the interactions between opportunism, organizational justice, relationship performance, and governance costs. The results indicate that interactional justice and distributive justice reduce the effect of both strong and weak opportunism on relationship performance and governance costs. Chapter 4 discusses the theoretical, social, and managerial implications of the study, suggesting that justice-based practices mitigate opportunistic behaviors and enhance relational performance. Furthermore, the chapter outlines potential directions for future research. This dissertation contributes to the understanding of the effects of opportunism in agricultural cooperatives by demonstrating the capacity of organizational justice to constrain such practices.